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I. INTRODUCTION
Americans’ scrutiny of policing practices peaks whenever high
profile cases of police brutality capture the national attention. In the
1990s it was the beating of Rodney King and the killing of Amadou
Diallo, and in the 2000s the shooting deaths of Sean Bell and Oscar
Grant. Today, the police shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson,
Missouri, and subsequent shootings of unarmed Black men have
sparked yet another reevaluation of police use of force and of police
practices in communities of color.1
* Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of New Jersey.
This Article is dedicated to all of the people who have worked to build police
accountability across our nation. In particular, I would like to thank the staff and
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The regimes currently in place to hold police officers accountable
for wrongdoing have faced particular scrutiny, as frustrations have
grown over their failures to hold police officers accountable for
wrongdoing.2 While there are many governmental agencies with the
jurisdiction to oversee police departments—including local
prosecutors, internal affairs bureaus, civilian review boards, and state
attorneys general—there is a growing feeling that these institutions
have too often failed when it comes to overseeing police departments.
An August 2014 poll conducted by USA Today and the Pew
Research Center found that 65% of Americans believe that police
departments nationwide do a poor or fair job of holding police officers
accountable when misconduct occurs, compared with 30% who say
they do an excellent or good job.3 A separate 2014 poll found that
while a large majority of Americans (78%) have a favorable view of the
members of the ACLU of New Jersey, New York Civil Liberties Union, Newark
Communities for Accountable Policing, Communities United for Police Reform, and
all of the activists and community members who have worked tirelessly to build police
accountability in Newark, New York City, and beyond. Working with community
partners to create the New York City Police Department (NYPD) Inspector General’s
Office and the Civilian Complaint Review Board in Newark helped me form my vision
of police accountability. A special thank you to my ACLU of New Jersey and Gibbons
PC colleagues who worked to create Newark’s Civilian Complaint Review Board,
including Ari Rosmarin, Ed Barocas, Jasmine Crenshaw, Larry Lustberg, Ana Munoz,
Alex Shalom, Allison Peltzman, and Rashawn Davis, as well as the movement’s
grassroots leaders, including Ingrid Hill, Rick Robinson, Emily Turonis, John Smith,
Laquan Thomas, Milly Silva and Mary Cruz. I also want to thank Seton Hall Law
Professor Linda Fisher and the students in her Civil Litigation Clinic—Natasha
Beckford, Jessica Maxwell, Brian McDonough, and Dennise Mejia—who provided
valuable research for this Article.
1
While shootings of unarmed Black men are at the forefront of this current
conversation, the spectrum of practices under review run the gamut of policing
practices—from a reevaluation of all use of excessive force to stop-and-frisk practices
and civil asset forfeiture. The current conversations also come in the context of a
much broader one on mass incarceration and bipartisan momentum to fix the nation’s
broken criminal justice system.
2
See, e.g., Ross Jones, Many Civilian Review Groups Have Limited Power to Resolve
Allegations of Police Misconduct, SCRIPPS NEWS (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.wptv.com/
news/national/many-civilian-review-groups-lack-the-power-to-resolve-allegations-ofpolice-misconduct (reporting how strained police-community relations have put a new
spotlight on ineffective civilian oversight of police); Matt Pearce, Ferguson Plan for Police
Oversight Board is Derided as ‘Insulting’, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2014, 6:17 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-0911-ferguson-review-board-20140912story.html (citing residents and policing experts criticizing Ferguson citizens’ review
board as “weak” and “insulting”).
3
Susan Page, Poll: Whites and Blacks Question Police Accountability, USA TODAY (Aug.
26, 2014, 4:42 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/
08/25/usa-today-pew-poll-police-tactics-military-equipment/14561633/ (discussing
poll taken soon after the death of Michael Brown, which found that Americans, by a
2-1 margin, believe that police departments do not treat racial groups equally).
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police, only 46% believe that police officers are held accountable for
wrongdoing.4
How can it be that with so many accountability regimes in place,
Americans still believe that the police oversight system is broken? The
answer is that these institutions, which range tremendously in scope
and power, have often times failed to adequately oversee local law
enforcement agencies, and that many of these regimes were rigged to
fail in the first place given their limited mandates and authorities. For
example, my research has found that of the top fifty largest police
departments in the nation, only six have civilian review boards with
some form of disciplinary authority.5
There are at least three gaps that exist when it comes to holding
police officers and their departments accountable for wrongdoing.
First, and most importantly, there is a need to hold police officers
accountable for the unjustified use of deadly force against civilians.
Police officers are afforded extraordinary powers not only to deprive
individuals of their liberties, but, in extreme circumstances, to deprive
them of their lives. When these powers are abused, they lead to tragic
consequences. Unfortunately, there are inconsistent and often times
inadequate mechanisms in place to hold police officers accountable
for these actions.
Second, there is the need to hold police officers accountable for
day-to-day transgressions that normally go unaccounted for and lead
to resentments growing in communities most impacted by such
practices, mainly low-income communities of color. These police
behaviors, which may include discourtesy, an illegal stop and/or
search, or an offensive slur, may appear minor when compared to cases
involving police shootings or use of force. But when these behaviors
are compounded thousands of times a year, the impact can be severe.

4

Reason-Rupe Poll: April 2014 National Telephone Survey, REASON.COM (Apr. 3, 2014,
9:00 AM), https://reason.com/poll/2014/04/03/april-2014-national-telephonesurvey. The same poll also found a split in Americans’ views on whether police
misconduct cases are increasing (41%) or have stayed about the same (48%).
5
See infra app.
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Take, for example, stop-and-frisk practices,6 which in certain
communities can take place thousands, if not tens of thousands of
times a year, as have been documented in cities such as New York City,7
Newark,8 and Philadelphia.9 In these cities, innocent people have been
6

For an example of the impact of stop-and-frisk practices on individuals, see this
description by Nicholas Peart about his numerous encounters with the NYPD: “These
experiences changed the way I felt about the police. After the third incident I worried
when police cars drove by; I was afraid I would be stopped and searched or that
something worse would happen. I dress better if I go downtown. I don’t hang out
with friends outside my neighborhood in Harlem as much as I used to. Essentially, I
incorporated into my daily life the sense that I might find myself up against a wall or
on the ground with an officer’s gun at my head. For a black man in his 20s like me,
it’s just a fact of life in New York.” Nicholas K. Peart, Why is the N.Y.P.D. After Me?, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
12/18/opinion/sunday/young-black-and-frisked-by-the-nypd.html.
7
See Stop-and-Frisk Data, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.nyclu.org/
content/stop-and-frisk-data (last visited Apr. 14, 2016) (documenting stop-and-frisk
practices from 2002–2015, including millions of stops of innocent people); Editorial,
Racial Discrimination in Stop-and-Frisk, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/opinion/racial-discrimination-in-stop-andfrisk.html (noting that of the 4.4 million stops between January 2004 and June 2012,
“only 6% resulted in arrests and 6% resulted in summonses,” meaning that the vast
majority of those stopped were not engaged in criminal behavior).
8
See Udi Ofer & Ari Rosmarin, Stop-and-Frisk: A First Look, Six Months of Data on
Stop-and-Frisk Practices in Newark, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION N.J. (Feb. 2014),
https://www.aclu-nj.org/files/8113/9333/6064/2014_02_25_nwksnf.pdf (providing
first-ever documentation of stop-and-frisk practices in Newark, which found that
Newark Police officers use stop-and-frisk with great frequency, in a manner that leads
to racial disparities, and that the vast majority of people stopped were not engaged in
criminal behavior). From July to December 2013, police officers made ninety-one
stops per 1000 Newark residents—nearly one person stopped for every ten residents—
exceeding the rate in New York City of eight stops per 1000 residents over the same
period in 2013. Id. at 5. Black Newarkers make up 52% of the population, but they
represented 75% of all stops. Id. at 8. The analysis also found that of those stopped
in Newark, 75% were innocent and walked away without receiving a summons or being
arrested. Id. at 10. See also Dan Ivers, Newark Stop-and-Frisks Fall Under Baraka, Though
Blacks, ‘Innocents’ Still More Likely to be Targeted, NJ.COM (Jan. 28, 2015, 2:43 PM),
http://www.nj.com/essex/index.ssf/2015/01/newark_stop-andfrisks_fall_under_baraka_though_bl.html (including latest data available on stop-andfrisk in Newark, showing that in 2014, of the 17,726 stops the police department
recorded, 11,903, or 67%, were African-American, 79% of people stopped were not
arrested or ticketed for wrongdoing, and that Newark police were making more than
seventy stops per 100,000 people, a rate more than thirty times higher than New York
City’s rate); Monique O. Madan, U.S. Inquiry Reports Bias by the Police in Newark, N.Y.
TIMES (July 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/23/nyregion/inquiry-ofnewark-police-cites-a-pattern-of-bias.html (citing a three-year federal investigation
finding that the Newark Police Department engaged in a pattern of unconstitutional
stop-and-frisk practices, including that the vast majority of pedestrian stops were
unjustified, and that Newark police officers stopped Blacks at a considerably higher
rate than Whites and underreported the use of force by officers).
9
See Philadelphia Police Continue to Stop Tens of Thousands Illegally, AM. CIV.
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stopped-and-frisked, and few have had the ability to seek redress. Most
attorneys have little incentive to take an individual stop-and-frisk case,
as there is little available in money damages. Prosecutors will not get
involved unless the stop rises to a criminal violation of rights. A victim
can file a complaint with a police department’s internal affairs office,
but few do so since they lack confidence in filing a complaint against
the police with the police. And while some municipalities have a
civilian review board to adjudicate these complaints, the vast majority
serve only in an advisory role10 or are not even equipped to
independently investigate complaints, as this Article explains in
further detail. There is a clear need to hold police officers accountable
for these behaviors before the problem becomes so widespread that it
triggers a class action lawsuit or a United States Department of Justice
investigation.
Third, there is a need for the establishment of agencies, or units
within existing entities, charged with reviewing patterns in policing
practices that may reveal broader problems. This responsibility often
falls on an inspector general, a position that is part of good
government practices overseeing large government entities, including
law enforcement agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigations
and the Department of Homeland Security. Yet relatively few police
departments are monitored through an inspector general dedicated
solely to them.11 Large police departments should be overseen by an
inspector general to review whether the problem of police misconduct
LIBERTIES UNION PA. (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.aclupa.org/news/2015/02/24/
philadelphia-police-continue-stop-tens-thousands-illegally (finding that “despite
having almost four years to improve its stop and frisk practices, the [Philadelphia
Police Department] continued to illegally stop and frisk tens of thousands of
individuals”).
10
Take, for example, New York City’s civilian review board. While it has wide
authority to accept complaints and possesses subpoena authority to investigate
allegations of wrongdoing, final disciplinary authority still lies with the Police
Commissioner.
New York City CCRB Rules, §§ 1-02(c), 1-45(a) (2013),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/downloads/pdf/ccrb_rules.pdf (“The findings and
recommendations of the Board, and the basis thereof, regarding case investigations
and administrative prosecutions shall be submitted to the Police Commissioner . . . .
The Police Commissioner shall retain in all respects the authority and discretion to
make final disciplinary determinations.”).
11
There are exceptions. For example, New York City recently established an
inspector general dedicated solely to reviewing NYPD practices (I helped draft the
legislation creating the agency and helped shepherd it through the New York City
Council). J. David Goodman, City Council Votes to Increase Oversight of New York Police,
N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/nyregion/newyork-city-council-votes-to-increase-oversight-of-police-dept.html.
Numerous review
boards have the authority to make recommendations regarding policy and practices,
but do not appear to use that authority with regularity.
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is an isolated one or part of a larger policy or set of practices emanating
from police headquarters.
This Article focuses on creating a model of police accountability
that fulfills the second and third gaps identified above.12 This model is
a variation of an old one, a civilian complaint review board,13 but avoids
the pitfalls of previous review boards by bestowing it with the powers
necessary to aggressively investigate police misconduct, to ensure that
discipline sticks when wrongdoing is found to have occurred, and to
keep an eye out for systemic problems within policing. The model that
this Article proposes would be independent not only from the police
department, but also from politics by having a fixed budget and a
board membership that is majority nominated by civic and community
organizations. Such a structure also ensures community voice and
perspective in discipline and in reviewing police policies and practices.
A variation of this proposed model is currently being attempted in
Newark, New Jersey.14
Given the growing momentum to rein in police abuses, now is the
time to think creatively on all three of the needs previously identified.

12

As stated earlier, the need to hold police officers accountable for the unjustified
use of deadly force is the most pressing priority.
13
This Article uses the terms “oversight board” and “review board”
interchangeably.
14
On March 16, 2016, the Newark Municipal Council passed legislation creating
one of the nation’s strongest police civilian review boards. David Porter, Newark OKs
Strong Police Review Board; Union Vows Fight, AP (Mar. 16, 2016, 8:43 PM),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/a4867d7361a24653ab5a3bc13e727d2a/newark-okstrong-police-review-board-union-vows-fight. This review board will have the power to
investigate complaints of misconduct lodged by civilians against Newark police
officers. It will be comprised of eleven civilian members: one will be appointed by the
mayor, three by the Municipal Council, and seven nominated by community and civil
rights organizations. The board will have subpoena authority to compel the
production of documents and the testimony of witnesses and have the authority to
make discipline stick when wrongdoing is found to have occurred. A pre-negotiated
disciplinary matrix will decide the discipline doled out. In addition, the board will
have inspector general powers to audit policies and practices. And it will have vast and
unprecedented public reporting requirements, not only on its operations but also on
policing practices in Newark, including arrests, summonses, stop-and-frisk, use of
force, etc. The legislation creating the Newark civilian review board, however, does
not guarantee a fixed income source, which weakens its independence and may prove
to be a fatal flaw if future mayoral administrations decide to defund it. Advocates and
community members fought for the inclusion of this provision but failed. See generally
City of Newark, N.J., Ordinance Amending Title II, Chapter 2, Office of the Mayor and
Agencies of the Revised General Ordinances of the City of Newark, New Jersey 2000,
as Amended and Supplemented, by Creating and Establishing a Civilian Complaint
Review Board 16-0276 (Mar. 16, 2016), https://newark.legistar.com/Legislation
Detail.aspx?ID=2573481&GUID=13232B4A-53F9-4E99-8440-8FE11FB761B2&
Options=&Search=&FullText=1 [hereinafter Newark Ordinance].
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The model proposed in this Article is just one solution towards the goal
of providing an avenue to hold police officers accountable for
wrongdoing that normally would go unaccounted for. Implementing
this proposal will lead to a significant reshaping of policing practices
while also giving civilians a meaningful voice in decisions over officer
discipline. Such a rethinking of the disciplinary process will lead to
changes in the relationships between community members and their
police departments.
Some who read this proposal may have already lost faith in civilian
complaint review boards, particularly as they have proliferated across
the nation yet have failed in many circumstances to hold police officers
accountable for wrongdoing. I share this frustration. It is important,
however, to separate frustration over the current models from
rejecting the idea of independent civilian oversight altogether. Many
civilian review boards have failed across the nation because they were
rigged to fail—they lacked adequate authority and resources to achieve
their missions. What this Article proposes has been largely untried and
is meant to remedy those very inadequacies that have led to a loss of
faith in civilian review boards.
II. OVERVIEW OF CIVILIAN REVIEW BOARDS
The concept behind a civilian review board is a simple one:
civilians and not police personnel should have the power to investigate
and make findings on police officer wrongdoing. Having police
officers police themselves presents obvious conflicts of interest, while
having civilians conduct these investigations provides an external
check on the police. The hope is that if civilians handle the
investigatory process, it will be a fairer and more effective one than if
the police were charged with policing themselves.15 Civilian oversight
also furthers democratic principles by allowing civilians to have more
control over their police departments.16
For purposes of this Article, I use the following definition of a
civilian review board, a variation of a definition used by police
accountability expert professor Sam Walker17: an agency staffed with
15

Joel Miller, Civilian Oversight of Policing: Lessons from the Literature, VERA INST.
JUST. 2 (May 5–8, 2002), http://vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/
Civilian_oversight.pdf [hereinafter Vera Institute].
16
Id. at 3.
17
Professor Walker’s definition is: “an agency or procedure that involves
participation by persons who are not sworn officers (citizens) in the review of citizen
complaints against the police and/or other allegations of misconduct by police
officers.” Samuel Walker, The History of the Citizen Oversight, in CITIZEN OVERSIGHT OF
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 1, 2 (Justina Cintron Perino ed., 2006),
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civilians, and not sworn officers, charged with investigating civilian
complaints of misconduct by police officers.18 In my definition, I
emphasize the investigative component of a civilian review board and
therefore disqualify those boards that review the findings of internal
police investigations.
A. History of Civilian Review Board
Civilian complaint review boards have existed since the 1940s.
The first one, Washington D.C.’s Complaint Review Board, was
established in 1948 in response to concerns about police brutality and
followed lobbying by the Urban League and National Conference of
Christians and Jews.19 The board was largely ineffective and disbanded
in 1973, only to be reestablished in 1982 and further strengthened in
2001.20 New York City established its first Civilian Complaint Review
Board in 1953 in response to a United States Department of Justice
investigation that found police brutality and a broken system unable to
hold police officers accountable for misconduct; this board was
dismantled in 1966 following intense lobbying by the police union.21
In the 1960s, the concept of civilian review of the police began to
take hold as the civil rights movement challenged police brutality and
http://apps.americanbar.org/abastore/products/books/abstracts/5330089samplec
h_abs.pdf.
18
This Article has a narrower definition of civilian review than used historically by
others. I do so purposefully. When the public calls for independent investigations of
police misconduct, I believe they are calling for investigations to be conducted by
civilians and in an agency that is independent from the police department. In contrast,
some review boards, while separate from the police department, do not conduct their
own investigations but rather review those internal investigations conducted by the
police.
For example, Boston’s Community Ombudsman Oversight Panel is
empowered to review Boston Police Department internal investigation cases appealed
by complainants. Yet it has no subpoena authority, and is explicitly prohibited from
interviewing witnesses or conducting its own independent investigations. See City of
Bos., Mass., Exec. Order, Mayor Thomas M. Menino, Establishing a Community
Ombudsman Oversight Panel and Complaint Mediation Program, City of Boston
(Mar. 14, 2007), https://www.cityofboston.gov/
images_documents/exec_order_tcm3-9873.pdf. Other boards, like the Citizens
Advisory Board in Phoenix, do not even review internal police investigations but are
only charged with helping to “[c]reate a climate of trust between the community and
the Phoenix Police Department” and to “[p]rovide a forum where the Phoenix Police
Department can actively listen actively” to the public.” See City of Phoenix, Citizen
Advisory Boards, CITY PHX., https://www.phoenix.gov/police/neighborhoodresources/citizen-advisory-boards (last visited Apr. 15, 2016). When the public calls
for independent investigation of police misconduct, I do not believe they have either
one of these options in mind.
19
Vera Institute, supra note 15, at 10.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 14.
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began to call for civilian oversight of the police. But, it was not until
the 1970s, when public attitudes towards the police began to change,22
that civilian review boards began to be adopted across the nation. In
1973, Berkeley, California became the first city to establish a Police
Review Commission with the independent authority to investigate
complaints of police misconduct.23 Since then, more than 100 civilian
review boards have been established throughout the nation.24
Today, there are four kinds of civilian oversight entities. The most
active ones, which are the focus of this Article, investigate civilian
allegations of police misconduct and either recommend discipline to
the police chief or have some variation of authority to independently
discipline police officers. A second type reviews the findings of
internal investigations conducted by the police and make
recommendations to the police chief on whether or not to follow the
recommendations of those reviews. A third type allows civilians to
appeal the findings of internal police investigations, with the review
board reviewing the internal police process and making
recommendations of its own findings to the police chief based on the
internal police investigation. Finally, some civilian boards serve a
limited auditor function, investigating the process by which police
departments accept and investigate civilian complaints of
misconduct.25
B. Civilian Review in the Nation’s Top Fifty Police Departments26
A review of the nation’s top fifty police departments27 and their
civilian review board structures demonstrates some of the deficiencies
in these oversight systems, as well as the lack of any review boards to
oversee many police departments. Collectively, these departments
22

Walker, supra note 17, at 7–8.
Id. at 4.
24
Id.
25
See PETER FINN, U.S. DEP’T JUST., CITIZEN REVIEW OF POLICE: APPROACHES AND
IMPLEMENTATION vii (Mar. 2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/184430.pdf.
26
Working with Seton Hall Law students at Professor Linda Fisher’s Civil
Litigation Clinic, we reviewed the composition of the civilian oversight agencies of the
top fifty police departments in the nation. This included review of the civilian
oversight agencies’ legal authority, membership, scope of jurisdiction, investigatory
and disciplinary powers, and budget. The students who worked on the project were
Natasha Beckford, Jessica Maxwell, Brian McDonough, and Dennise Mejia. Research
is on file with the author.
27
The top fifty police departments were chosen according to the number of fulltime sworn personnel in 2013 according to the Justice Department. Brian A. Reeves,
Local Police Departments, 2013: Personnel, Policies, and Practices, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 14 tbl.2
(May 2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd13ppp.pdf.
23

OFER (DO NOT DELETE)

1042

5/18/2016 12:52 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1033

represent civilian populations of close to fifty-two million residents and
police departments with close to 147,000 officers.
Of the top fifty largest police departments, twenty-six have no
civilian review board as defined by this Article.28 While some do
include a form of civilian oversight, such as in Los Angeles,29 most of
these departments have no civilian oversight beyond the normal
structure of city government. The departments without a civilian
review board represent more than twenty-three million residents who
do not have an avenue to file complaints against the police that will be
adjudicated independently by civilians (outside of traditional avenues,
such as civil litigation).
Of the remaining twenty-four departments, all but nine are
overseen by a review board that is majority nominated and majority
appointed by the mayor (or in combination with the head of the
police), thus minimizing the independence of such boards.30 For
example, New York City’s Civilian Complaint Review Board is
comprised of thirteen members, but the mayor and police
commissioner appoint eight of the thirteen members.31 The nine
civilian review boards that are led by a majority of non-mayoral
nominees are Dallas, Miami-Dade, Las Vegas, Detroit, Atlanta,
Indianapolis, Miami, Newark, and Albuquerque. Detroit has a Police
Commission led by eleven members, seven of whom are elected by the
people of Detroit, a model that exists in no other review board among
the top fifty police departments.32
Subpoena authority appears to have become more common
among the civilian review boards overseeing the nation’s largest
departments, with nineteen boards being empowered with subpoena
authority, including the boards overseeing the nation’s two largest
28

See infra app.
Los Angeles has a complicated civilian oversight model, but has no independent
entity charged with investigating civilian complaints of police officer misconduct. The
Police Commission is technically the head of the Los Angeles Police Department. The
Commission hires and fires the police chief and can make final decisions on all
departmental policies. But it cannot impose discipline. The Function and Role of the
Board of Police Commissioners, L.A. POLICE DEP’T, http://www.lapdonline.org/police_
commission/content_basic_view/900 (last visited Apr. 15, 2016). Then there is Los
Angeles Inspector General who is empowered to conduct investigations, such as audit
of internal affairs. It can accept civilian complaints, but will turn those over to the
Police Department to investigate. See Office of the Inspector General, L.A. POLICE DEP’T,
http://www.lapdonline.org/police_commission/content_basic_view/1076
(last
visited Apr. 15, 2016).
30
See infra app.
31
Id.
32
Id.
29
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police departments, New York City and Chicago.33 But there are some
glaring exceptions. Houston, the fifth largest police department in the
nation, has a police oversight board with no subpoena authority.34
Baltimore’s civilian review board also has no subpoena authority,
despite overseeing the ninth largest police department in the nation.35
On the other hand, some form of disciplinary authority remains
relatively rare, with only six civilian review boards having it—Chicago,
Washington, D.C., Detroit, Milwaukee, San Francisco, and Newark.36
This is the most revealing finding of this analysis and at the core of the
frustrations felt by the public on the deficiencies of current oversight
models. For all of the structures and supposed independence of the
review boards, eighteen of the twenty-four are subject to the whim of
the police department when it comes to final decision-making on
discipline.
Finally, nineteen review boards are explicitly authorized to review
and make recommendations related to departmental policies and
practices, although it is unclear how many of these boards actually
exercise these authorities.37 In the nation’s largest police department,
the New York City Police Department (NYPD), a newly formed
Inspector General focuses solely on auditing NYPD policies and
practices.38 It is unclear, however, how many of the boards with explicit
policy review authority actually utilize it.
Of the nation’s fifty largest police departments, the only review
board that has a leadership structure that is not majority nominated by
the mayor and that is empowered with subpoena, disciplinary, and
policy review authorities, is Detroit’s. Newark’s review board will also
have these features once it is built.
III. KEY COMPONENTS OF EFFECTIVE CIVILIAN REVIEW
Based on my review of the existing civilian review board models as
well as conversations with colleagues, advocates, and community
members from across the nation who have all experienced these
various models in their respective cities, I propose the following
features as necessary to create an effective civilian review board. The
proposed features are meant to address the weaknesses in current
33

Id.
Id.
35
Id.
36
See infra app.
37
Id.
38
As mentioned earlier, I helped draft the legislation creating the NYPD Inspector
General and pass it through the New York City Council.
34
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models, including the lack of direct community input in the leadership
structure, inadequate investigatory and discipline authorities, the lack
of authority to audit and make recommendations for overall police
policies and practices, the lack of stable and robust financial support,
and the lack of transparency in policing practices.
A. Board Majority Nominated by Civic Organizations
The make-up of the leadership of the review board sets the tone
for the entire operation of the board. While professional staff trained
in investigative and fact-finding techniques will conduct most of the
work of the board, board members are the ones who will make
decisions to move forward with investigations and discipline.
This Article proposes a board composition model where the
majority of the board is nominated by civic organizations that have an
interest in the safety of the city and in the civil rights of community
members, with the rest nominated by the mayor and lawmakers. This
will ensure the independence of the board and its legitimacy in the
eyes of city residents. Nominees to the board should have expertise in
a relevant field in order to be appointed, such as a legal, civil rights, or
law enforcement background.39 The nominees should have a
demonstrated commitment to the well-being of the city where they live,
and a strong understanding of the importance of upholding civil rights
and civil liberties in policing. They should also believe in a police
department that operates in a transparent and accountable manner.
No member of the board should be a current or former employee of
the police department that the board oversees, and a majority of board
members should not have a law enforcement background.
In Newark, the newly established civilian review board will be
composed of eleven members, seven of whom will be nominated by
civil rights, immigrants’ rights, and community-based organizations.
39

In my review of the civilian review models, I came across several that disqualified
those with a criminal record from being appointed to the board. For example, in
Austin, the Citizen Review Panel requires that panel members have no felony
convictions or indictments.
Citizen Review Panel, AUSTINTEXAS.GOV,
http://www.austintexas.gov/department/citizen-review-panel (last visited Apr. 15,
2016). In Miami, the Civilian Investigative Panel disqualifies individuals with a felony
conviction record.
Members, CITY OF MIAMI CIVILIAN INVESTIGATIVE PANEL,
http://www.miamigov.com/cip/pages/Members/cipmembers.asp (last visited Apr.
15, 2016). I strongly recommend against such prohibitions. A person’s past
convictions should not be the sole determinative factor of his or her ability to
responsibly review complaints of officer misconduct; it should not be an automatic
disqualification. Moreover, given the racial disparities associated with arrest and
incarceration rates, disqualifying people based solely on their criminal records will
have a disproportionate and unfair impact on communities of color.
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The nominees are presented to the mayor, who then appoints the
board members subject to the advice and consent of the Municipal
Council. The following organizations and entities have nominating
authority: American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey; National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) of New
Jersey; People’s Organization for Progress; La Casa de Don Pedro;
Ironbound Community Corporation; Newark Anti-Violence Coalition;
and a representative of the clergy community.40 The mayor is obligated
to appoint Newark’s Inspector General to the board, and the
Municipal Council nominates three members to the board.41
In my review of the boards for the top fifty largest police
departments, I could only find one example, in addition to the review
board recently created in Newark, of a review board that empowers a
civic organization with the authority to nominate civilian review board
members. The Atlanta Citizen Review Board is led by eleven members.
Four are appointed by civic organizations: Gate City Bar Association,
Atlanta Bar Association, League of Women Voters, and Atlanta
Business League.42 While not giving them direct authority, Baltimore
has non-voting members on the Civilian Review Board, including
representatives from the ACLU, NAACP, and the Fraternal Order of
Police.43
B. Broad Scope to Review Complaints
Since the very purpose of the civilian review board is to provide
an avenue for individuals to seek redress for misconduct that would
otherwise go unaddressed, the scope of complaints that the review
board adjudicates must be broad. The range, at the very least, should
include adjudication of cases involving excessive use of force, abuse of
authority, unlawful arrest, unlawful stop, unlawful searches,
discourtesy or disrespectful behavior, use of offensive language, theft,
and discriminatory behavior.
Many of the misbehaviors that would fall under the jurisdiction of
the board would otherwise go unaddressed if not for the review board.
Years of such unaddressed misconduct have been a significant factor
in the deterioration of police-community relations. While a wrongful
40

Newark Ordinance, supra note 14, at Part I.2 (a).
Id.
42
About Us, ATLANTIC CITIZEN REVIEW BD., http://acrbgov.org/about-us/ (last
visited Apr. 15, 2016).
43
See Baltimore City Office of Civil Rights and Wage Enforcement: Board Members, CITY
OF BALT., http://civilrights.baltimorecity.gov/civilian-review-board/commission (last
visited Apr. 15, 2016).
41
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stop-and-frisk is nowhere as egregious as a police shooting, the fact is
that the former offense is committed with much more frequency—in
some cities tens of thousands of times a year—and with fewer people
paying attention. A civilian review board that is performing its
functions correctly will provide community members with the
opportunity to seek redress for each and every one of these illegal
stops.
C. Independent Investigatory Authority
A civilian complaint review board will be only as strong as its
authority to conduct independent investigations, and at the heart of
such authority must be the ability to subpoena witnesses and
documents, including internal police disciplinary documents, medical
records, surveillance footage, and other materials relevant to an
investigation. Subpoena authority will also allow the board to order a
person to testify before it.
Subpoena authority has become more common in the civilian
review boards that oversee large police departments, but is still not
standard practice even among large cities. The review of the civilian
oversight systems of the top fifty police departments revealed that only
nineteen have civilian review boards with subpoena authority.44
Independent subpoena authority is particularly important given
the historic difficulties of compelling police officers who have
witnessed wrongdoing to testify against their fellow officers.45 The
unwritten rule, the “blue wall of silence,” sometimes even encourages
police officers to refuse to cooperate in investigations.46

44

See infra app.
See Radley Balko, Why Cops Aren’t Whistleblowers, REASON.COM,
http://reason.com/archives/2011/01/25/why-cops-arent-whistleblowers (last visited
Apr. 15, 2016) (documenting examples of retaliation against police officers who try to
expose or testify against police misconduct) (“It may be true that abusive cops are few
and far between, as police organizations typically claim. The problem is that other
cops rarely hold them accountable . . . . For all the concern about the ‘Stop Snitchin’’
message within the hip-hop community, police have engaged in a far more impactful
and pernicious Stop Snitchin’ campaign of their own. It’s called the Blue Wall of
Silence.”).
46
In 1970, New York City’s Commission to Investigate Alleged Police Corruption,
also known as the Knapp Commission, documented this practice extensively. Police
officer Frank Serpico testified about the so-called “Blue Curtain” where reporting on
a fellow officer was considered betrayal. See Report Says Police Corruption in 1971 Involved
Well Over Half on the Force, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1972, at 22.
45
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D. Ensure Discipline Sticks
An independent investigation will be meaningful only if its
findings then form the basis for deciding whether and to what extent
to discipline an officer. Yet it is at this phase of the review process
where even strong civilian review boards fail, such as New York City’s,
where the police commissioner has full discretion to ignore the
board’s fact-finding or to impose no discipline even when the board
has found that wrongdoing occurred.47 In 2012, for example, the
NYPD imposed no discipline in more than 40% of cases recommended
by the CCRB and followed the CCRB’s recommendation in only 9.7%
of cases.48
Under this proposed model, once the civilian review board’s
professional staff completes its thorough investigation and the board
substantiates an allegation of misconduct, the board’s findings of fact
will be binding on the head of the police department, who will then
determine discipline based on those facts and guided by a prenegotiated disciplinary matrix.49 Such a matrix will determine the
range of discipline options for the misbehavior and will ensure that
47

In 2012, the NYPD followed the New York City Civilian Complaint Review
Board’s (CCRB’s) recommendation in only 25 of 258 cases (9.7%). Officers received
no discipline in 104 cases (40.3%). Specifically, the New York City CCRB received
5741 complaints, and 258 complaints against NYPD officers were substantiated. The
CCRB recommended charges in 175 cases, command discipline in 70 cases, and
instructions in 12 cases. Of the 175 cases in which the CCRB recommended an officer
be charged, the NYPD sought charges only in seven. Officers received no discipline in
seventy-six of these cases. Of the seventy cases that the CCRB recommended command
discipline, in thirty-five cases the officer was only given instructions. Officers received
no discipline in twenty-four such cases. Kathleen Horan & Noah Veltman, Police
Officers Rarely Disciplined by NYPD for Misconduct, WNYC (Aug. 27, 2014),
http://www.wnyc.org/story/nypds-poor-track-record-meting-out-discipline-officermisconduct/.
Under the new city and CCRB leadership, the percentage of cases where the
NYPD adopts the CCRB’s recommendation has grown significantly. During the first
half of 2015, the discipline rate increased to 91% for cases substantiated by the CCRB
involving a penalty recommendation of command discipline or instructions. This was
the highest rate since the creation of the present-day CCRB in 1993. Press Release,
Civilian Complaint Rev. Board, NYC Civilian Complaint Rev. Board Issues 2015 MidYear Report: Complaints are Down, Substantiation are Increasing and Video Evidence
is
Increasingly
Paramount
to
Investigations
(Sept.
7,
2015),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/downloads/pdf/news-2015-midyear-reportreleased.pdf.
48
In 2012, the New York City CCRB made recommendations in 258 cases, and the
NYPD followed those recommendations in only 25 of the cases. Police officers
received no discipline in 104 of the 258 cases, representing 40.3% of all cases where
the CCRB made a recommendation. Horan & Veltman, supra note 47.
49
A disciplinary matrix is a chart that lists all of the various offenses for which a
police officer may be disciplined and then lists potential punishments for each offense,
taking into consideration the police officer’s past disciplinary record.
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discipline will always take place.
The head of the police department makes the final decision on
discipline but is bound by the independent factual investigation of the
civilian review board and the range of punishment included in the prenegotiated disciplinary matrix. This formula not only ensures
discipline when the civilian review board finds that wrongdoing has
occurred, but it also creates transparency and predictability in the
process, allowing the public to know ahead of time what type of
discipline will be faced for which type of misbehavior.
Narrow exceptions can be made for when the head of the police
department may depart from the factual findings of the review board,
but such exceptions must be carefully drawn and should only capture
those situations where an obvious error had been made in the board’s
factual investigation. For example, the board established in Newark
creates an exception for when a “clear error” was made in the civilian
review board’s investigation and defines clear error as: “[W]hen the
CCRB’s [Civilian Complaint Review Board’s] findings of fact are based
upon obvious and indisputable errors and cannot be supported by any
reasonable interpretation of the evidence.”50 Therefore, under
Newark’s model, the police director will make the final decision on
whether or not there is a clear error in the CCRB’s findings of fact. If
there is no clear error, then the board’s findings of fact will determine
the police director’s punishment of the officer based on a disciplinary
matrix.
E. Audit Policies and Practices
The authority of the oversight board must not be limited to
investigating individual allegations of misconduct. It should also have
the ability to review the underlying policies that may lead to individual
rights violations. This will ensure that the review board will be able to
expose potential problems that are bigger than any one individual act
of misconduct and prevent future wrongdoing.
The board’s auditing authority should be broad and include all
civil rights and public safety concerns. For example, if the review board
begins to receive a high number of stop-and-frisk complaints, it could
be indicative of a policy or practice to set quotas on police officers to
perform a certain number of stops per shift.51 Therefore, when the
50

Newark Ordinance, supra note 14, at Part V.E. § 1-17(b).
See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein, Stop-and-Frisk Trial Turns to Claim of Arrest Quotas, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/nyregion/stop-andfrisk-trial-focuses-on-claim-of-arrest-quotas.html (reporting on the testimony delivered
by NYPD officer Adhyl Polanco on the “20 and 1” rule, where the NYPD leadership
51
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civilian review board notices a pattern of many complaints, or a rise in
the number of complaints involving a pedestrian or vehicular stop, it
should charge its auditing unit with investigating whether there was a
broader policy decision or unwritten practice that led to these actions
by individual police officers.
Other examples of potential reviews include an audit of the
impact of a “broken windows” policing philosophy52 on civil rights and
civil liberties, racial disparities in the enforcement of low-level offenses,
or problems with 911 call response times in certain neighborhoods.
By including an inspector general authority within a review board
charged with accepting complaints of individual misconduct, the
board will have a firm grasp of any developing trends.
Once the auditing unit of the board completes its investigation, it
should have the authority to make formal recommendations of policy
reforms to the mayor, head of the police department, and city
council.53 The findings and recommendations of the auditing unit
and police unions expected each officer to make twenty summonses and one arrest a
month).
52
Broken windows policing was first introduced in a 1982 Atlantic article. George
L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/brokenATLANTIC,
windows/4465/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2016). The article argued that because
community members care deeply about public order, the appearance of disorder
breaks down community controls and leads to community members feeling less
committed to their neighborhoods, thus allowing for the introduction of criminal
elements into the community. Therefore, according to the theory, law enforcement
agencies should focus on responding aggressively to any public offense that may
appear disorderly, no matter how minor. Kelling and Wilson recognized that police
officers responding aggressively to the appearance of public disorder and minor
offenses (even those that are not criminal) raises Fourth Amendment and racial
profiling concerns. They recognized that Black and Latino residents may be
disproportionately targeted by these policies and practices, but ultimately they largely
ignored these concerns. Broken windows policing has been widely criticized. See e.g.,
Benjamin Bowling, The Rise and Fall of New York Murder: Zero Tolerance or Crack’s Decline?,
39 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 531, 531 (1999) (attributing the decrease in homicide rates in
the 1990s to the decrease of the crack cocaine epidemic, which had begun before the
implementation of broken windows policing); Bernard E. Harcourt, Policing Disorder:
Can We Reduce Serious Crime by Punishing Petty Offenses?, BOS. REV.,
http://bostonreview.net/archives/BR27.2/harcourt.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2016)
(originally published in Apr./May 2002 issue of Boston Review) (criticizing the lack of
an adequate definition of disorder—suggesting that what proponents of broken
windows policing might call disorder may be perceived entirely differently by another
segment of the population and may actually mean strong community bonds (graffiti is
one example)—and presenting alternative theories for the decline in crime in New
York City).
53
While the policy recommendations of the board will not be binding, they are
an important mechanism to highlight deficiencies within the department and to drive
a public conversation that would otherwise be ignored. A recommendation by the
board can also legitimize concerns that had previously been raised by community
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should always be published as a report to the public.
F. Secure Funding
For the oversight board to be free from political manipulation
that could weaken it, its funding must be both secure and sufficiently
robust. Otherwise, a hostile administration could deprive the board of
its ability to perform its duties by simply cutting its funding.
To insulate the oversight board from cuts to funding due to
politically unpopular decisions, the board’s budget should be tied to a
fixed percentage of the police department’s non-capital budget. Thus,
if the police department’s operating budget increases due to the hiring
of additional police officers, so will the review board’s budget and staff,
and the opposite will happen if the police department lays off officers.
The percentage of a police department’s budget committed to
the review board should be fixed by law. That percentage must be
enough to cover the hiring of professional staff to run the board,
including an executive director, investigators, attorneys to prosecute
the complaints, and analysts to audit departmental policies and
practices. The budget should also be enough to fund accessible office
locations and hours, outreach, and public education materials.
In Newark’s newly created Civilian Complaint Review Board, the
board’s budget is not fixed to the police department’s budget, thus
weakening its independence.
G. Due Process Protections for Police Officers
Police officers who are accused of wrongdoing must be fully
protected from false accusations and must enjoy the full range of due
process protections in all stages of the investigatory and disciplinary
process, including the right to counsel and a hearing.
Prior to any discipline being imposed, a police officer must be
able to contest the civilian allegations and the findings of investigators.
Police officers must be allowed to access the evidence being used
against them, provide testimony, and offer responses and defenses to
the allegations of misconduct. If the review board substantiates a
civilian’s complaint, the police officer should have the right to appeal
the substantiation or the discipline. Throughout the process, police
officers should retain their rights as civil servants.

members and advocates but not taken seriously by the administration.
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H. Public Access/Reporting
For the review board to adequately serve the community,
residents should be able to easily file complaints. This should include
the filing of complaints online through the board’s website, but also
in-person and by e-mail, phone, or fax. Moreover, to allow for the inperson filing of complaints, the board’s office should be located in a
central location and remain open during hours that are accessible to
people who work or study full-time. Thus the review board should be
open during evening hours at least once a week and on a weekend at
least once a month. The board should also hold monthly public
meetings to report to community members on its activities, summarize
its findings, and have an open session to allow residents to ask
questions and raise concerns.
Finally, the board should publish quarterly reports on its website
summarizing its activities. The reporting should include the number
of complaints the board received, the types of complaints it received,
the basic facts of the complaints (without releasing personally
identifiable information), the disposition of those complaints, and any
discipline issued. The board should also issue an annual report
summarizing its work for the year and identifying any trends. Further,
the board should work collaboratively with the police department to
report basic data on policing practices, such as stop-and-frisk practices,
searches, use of force, arrests, and summonses. This will further
strengthen transparency and accountability.
Newark’s board has broad, even unprecedented, reporting
obligations. These obligations include quarterly reporting the
following information on its website: (1) the number of complaints
received, disaggregated by demographic information on the
complainant; (2) the basic facts and the disposition of the complaints;
(3) the number of stops made by police officers during the previous
quarter, including data disaggregated by date, time, location,
demographics of the person stopped, and reason and disposition of
the stop; (4) the number of use of force incidents by the police,
including data disaggregated by the demographics of the civilian,
description of the force used, reason for the force, and whether any
injuries resulted; (5) the number of arrests made by the police,
including data disaggregated by date, time, location, demographics of
the arrestee, the offense charged, and how the arrest came about; and
finally, (6) the amount of money Newark expended in settlements or
judgments to resolve claims filed against the police department and
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the basic facts associated with those claims.54 The board is also
mandated to publish an annual report, compiling statistics and
including any trends or areas of concern.55
IV. CONCLUSION
Building an effective civilian review board is no easy task. It
requires a groundswell of community support and a sophisticated
understanding of the nuances of civilian oversight. It helps to have a
willing mayor, city council (or at least a majority of the council), and
police chief. And it takes money and time to get it right.
As a consequence, all too often even well-meaning policymakers
and activists settle for less—a review board that has subpoena authority
but no power to make discipline stick, or a board that has access to
review internal police investigations but cannot conduct any of its own
independent ones. Arguably, a weak civilian review board is worse than
no civilian review board because it gives the illusion of independent
accountability but actually provides little to no accountability. A weak
civilian review board can lead to an increase in community resentment,
as residents go to the board to seek redress yet end up with little.
It is my hope that this Article will provide a clearer roadmap for
how to achieve an effective review board. Spending several years, even
decades as with Newark, to get it right is more important than moving
quickly and getting it wrong.

54
55

Newark Ordinance, supra note 14, at Part V.F. § 1-21(a)–(b).
Id. at Part V.F. § 1-21(c).
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APPENDIX OF CIVILIAN REVIEW BOARDS56 IN FIFTY LARGEST POLICE
DEPARTMENTS 57
Name of
Department

New York
City Police

Chicago
Police

Board Name and
Composition
Civilian Complaint
Review Board:
13 Members (5
appointed by
Mayor; 5 by City
Council; 3 by
Police
Commissioner)
Independent
Police Review
Authority:
Mayor appoints
chief civilian
administrator with
Council approval

Subpoena
Authority?

Discipline
Authority?

Policy
Review
Authority?

Yes

No

NYPD
Inspector
General

Yes
(IPRA)

Yes (PRB 3 person
panel may
overturn Police
Superintendent’s
decision to not
follow IPRA
discipline
recommendation)

Yes

Police Review
Board:
9 members
appointed by
Mayor with
Council consent
Los Angeles
Police
Philadelphia
Police

56

No Civilian Review Board*
Police Advisory
Commission:
15 members
appointed by
Mayor

Yes

No

Yes

A civilian review board is defined as an agency that is staffed by civilians, and
not sworn officers, charged with investigating civilian complaints against the police.
57
The police departments are listed in size order according to the number of fulltime sworn personnel, with the largest police department listed first and the smallest
police department (of the top fifty departments studied) listed last.
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Houston
Police

Washington
D.C.
Metropolitan
Police

Dallas Police
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Independent
Police Oversight
Board:
21 members
appointed by
Mayor and
approved by
Council
Office of Police
Complaints:
5 nominated by
Mayor (1 from
police
department) and
confirmed by
Council
Citizens Police
Review Board:
15 members, 1
appointed by each
Council Member

Phoenix
Police

Baltimore
Police
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No

No

No

Yes

Yes (if police
chief rejects
recommendation,
OPC may
overturn chief)

Yes

Yes

No

No

No Civilian Review Board*
Civilian Review
Board:
9 voting members
from each police
precinct
(nominated by
Mayor and
confirmed by
Council). Also 5
nonvoting
members
(Fraternal Order
of Police,
Vanguard Justice
Society, Baltimore
Police, ACLU of
Maryland, and

No

No

No
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Las Vegas
Metropolitan
Police

Detroit
Police

Memphis
Police
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NAACP of
Baltimore)
Civilian
Investigative
Panel: 13
members (9
appointed by City
Commission; 3 by
Mayor; 1 by
Police)
Citizen Review
Board:
25 members (13
members
appointed by
Clark County
Board of
Commissioners;
12 by Las Vegas
City Council Fiscal
Affairs
Committee)
Detroit Police
Commission: 11
members (7
elected by
residents from
each Police
District; 4
appointed by
Mayor and
approved by
Council)
Citizen Law
Enforcement
Review Board:
9 members (8
appointed by
Mayor and
approved by
Council; 1 Council
Member)

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No
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Suffolk
County
Police

Milwaukee
Police
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Fire and Police
Commission:
7 members
appointed by
Mayor and
confirmed by
Council

Yes

Yes

San Antonio
Police

No Civilian Review Board*

Nassau
County
Police

No Civilian Review Board*

San
Francisco
Police

Office of Citizen
Complaints:
Director
appointed by
Police
Commission with
approval by Mayor
and Board of
Supervisors
Police
Commission:
7 civilian members
(4 nominated by
Mayor (subject to
Board of
Supervisors
approval) and 3 by
Board of
Supervisors)

Yes

Yes (Police
Commission has
right to hear
appeals from
Police Chief’s
disciplinary
decisions and to
issue discipline
that is longer than
a 10-day
suspension)

Yes

Yes
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Honolulu
Police

Atlanta
Police
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No Civilian Review Board*

Honolulu Police
Commission:
7 Members
appointed by
Mayor and
confirmed by
Council
Atlanta Citizen
Review Board:
11 members (1
appointed by
Mayor; 1 by
Council; 1 by
Council President;
1 by each of the 4
Neighborhood
Planning Units; 1
by Gate City Bar
Association; 1 by
Atlanta Bar
Association; 1 by
League of Women
Voters; 1 by
Atlanta Business
League)

No

No

Yes

No

Columbus
Police

No Civilian Review Board*

Baltimore
County
Police

No Civilian Review Board*

San Diego
Police

No Civilian Review Board*

Limited –
May make
recommend
ations on
PD strategic
plan

Yes
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CharlotteMecklenburg
Police

No Civilian Review Board*

Austin Police

No Civilian Review Board*

Prince
George’s
County
Police

County Citizen
Complaint
Oversight Panel:
7 members
appointed by
County Executive
and confirmed by
Council

No

Yes

No Civilian Review Board*

Jacksonville
Sheriff’s
Office

Indianapolis
Metropolitan
Police

Yes

Citizens Police
Complaint Board:
12 members (9
civilian voting
members (6
appointed by
Council and 3 by
Mayor); 3 nonvoting police
officers (1
appointed by
Fraternal Order of
Police, 1 by Mayor,
and 1 by Council)

Yes

No

No

No Civilian Review Board*

Fort Worth
Police
Civilian Police
Review Board:

Yes

No

No
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7 members
appointed by
Mayor and
approved by
Council

Denver
Police

No Civilian Review Board*

Kansas City
Police

No Civilian Review Board*

Fairfax
County
Police

No Civilian Review Board*

Metropolitan
Nashville
Police

No Civilian Review Board*

St. Louis
Police

Civilian Oversight
Board:
7 members
nominated by
Mayor from each
city district and
confirmed by
Board of
Aldermen

No

No

Seattle
Police

No Civilian Review Board*

New Orleans
Police

No Civilian Review Board*

Yes
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Louisville
Police

No Civilian Review Board*

Montgomery
County
Police

No Civilian Review Board*

El Paso
Police

No Civilian Review Board*

Miami Police

Civilian
Investigative
Panel:
13 Members (9
appointed by City
Commission; 3 by
Mayor; 1 by Police
Chief)

San Jose
Police

Newark
Police

Yes

No

Yes

No Civilian Review Board*

Civilian Complaint
Review Board:
11 Members (1
appointed by
Mayor; 3
appointed by
Municipal
Council; 1
nominated by
ACLU of New
Jersey; 1 by
NAACP NJ; 1 by
People’s
Organization for
Progress; 1 by La
Casa de Don
Pedro; 1 by
Ironbound

Yes

Yes

Yes
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Community
Corporation; 1 by
Newark AntiViolence
Coalition; 1
representative of
clergy.
All subject to
Council approval)
Citizen Complaint
Authority:
7 members
appointed by
Mayor and
approved by
Council
Civilian Police
Oversight Agency:
9 members
appointed by
Council

Yes
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No Civilian Review Board*

* No civilian review board as defined by this Article: an agency staffed
with civilians, and not sworn officers, charged with investigating
civilian complaints of misconduct by police officers.

